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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is an epistemological attempt to synthesise four emerging 
paradigms in economic theory. These paradigms are the regulationist, the 
institutionalist, the post-modernist, and the post-development. Arguably, these are 
paradigms rather than models of behaviour because they each presents an analytical 
framework for examining different economic phenomena. We shall attempt to show 
that the four paradigms are useful, complementary, and can be symbiotically linked 
into a broader paradigm especially to examine the phenomenon of low growth in the 
region. 
If we use a modified Kuhnian (1970) model for paradigmatic shifts in a 
discipline, we can argue that there are three dominating, competing, normal 
paradigms in economic theory: neoclassical, Marxist, and development theory. In 
Kuhnian fashion, these three dominant paradigms are pressured by several crises of 
inability to explain phenomena. Many of these explanational crises are about Less 
Industrialised Countries (LICs), but increasingly these crises are also about the 
inability to explain change in the Industrialised Countries (ICs) and the Newly 
Industrialising Countries (NICs). One, these three paradigms have to explain the 
differential growth rates of economies. They have to explain the low growth of LICs 
relative to both the old NICs (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong 
Kong) and the new NICs (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and China). The collapse 
of the Soviet model also has to be explained. Two, these paradigms have to explain 
the coexistence of significant levels of poverty with affluence in the LIs, and NICs, 
and now emergent poverty in the ICs. Three, these paradigms also increasingly have 
to explain why in a country growth and distribution is biased in favour of particular 
ethnic and social groups, excluding others, fuelling ethnic and social conflicts within 
countries and across countries globally. Four, these paradigms have to establish 
whether the IC market-determined patterns of consumption demand can be satisfied 
globally. 
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Attempts to answer these question have thrown up sets of studies which can 
be grouped into emerging alternative paradigms, competing with the three older 
dominant paradigms, and with each other. We shall examine representative literature 
to characterise four such recent alternative paradigms. The object of this limited 
exercise is not to examine each paradigm comprehensively, but to show its 
complementarity and linkage to the others. The resulting synthesis into a broader, 
more comprehensive paradigm may be more useful in analysing problems of growth 
in this region. 
The first set of literature examined is from the regulationist school represented 
here by Alan Lipietz and Robert Boyer at CEPREMAP in Paris, Steve Marglin at 
Harvard, and Bob Rowthorn and Ajit Singh at Cambridge. This school provides a 
very broad-based framework for analysing a macro-economy. We feel, however, that 
the abstract categorisation of the regulationist school is undercut very well by the 
specification allowed by the institutionalist school as represented most recently by 
Douglas North, and earlier by Demsetz and Posner. The institutionalist school allows 
us to highlight a fracturing of the conventional categories of analysis like capital and 
labour, especially as illustrated by case-studies from Pakistan. 
This fracturing of the conventional categories of analysis is explained at a 
global level by post-modernist theories of information processing applied to 
analysing economic and social change; for instance by Doug Brown. However, to 
explain the specific fracturing of categories like capital and labour in Pakistan, we 
need a recourse to the emergent post-development school, represented here by Steve 
Marglin, Tariq Banuri, Ashis Nandy, and Arshad Zaman. They allow us to turn the 
question on its head, that the question is not to search for links within fractured 
categories like capital and labour, but as to why there should be any links within 
categories fractured by the colonial impact not just on the production bases, but 
more fundamentally on the knowledge bases. This conceptual itinerary across four 
schools or nascent paradigms allow us at the end of the paper to point out useful 
directions for research in synthesising a broader paradigm for analysing the lack of 
growth in the region. 
2.  THE REGULATIONIST PARADIGM 
2.1.  The Paradigm 
The neoclassical categories of analysis offer polarities, the atomistic agent, 
and the aggregated market environment. In contrast, the Marxist categories break 
ground by offering intermediate categories between the agent and the market, like 
capital and labour, and by offering relationships between these categories, like 
capital-labour relations. So the neoclassical analysis lacks intermediate categories 
like class, and relationships such as those between capital and labour, which the 
Marxist categories provide. In return, the Marxist analysis lacks a category 
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characterising the micro and macro environment like the market conditions provided 
by the neoclassicals. 
The regulationist school appears in many ways to synthesise the neoclassical 
and the Marxist categories of analysis in just this way. This school attempts to 
capture four essential environments or regimes for an economy, [Marglin  (1990); 
Glyn et al. (1990)]: 
(1) the global economy regime; 
(2) the domestic accumulation regime; 
(3) the production regime; and 
(4) the rules of coordination regime. 
The context of the development of the school helps to explain the 
establishment of these categories or regimes of analysis. Marglin and Glyn et al. 
have attempted to explain the long period of high capitalist growth for the ICs 
between the great depression and the global recession of the 1970s. 
(1) The global regime which explains the golden age is the economic and 
political domination by the US of the international order. The Pax 
Americana ensured an orderly flow of goods between LICs and ICs, with 
oil pegged at about $ 2 a barrel. The Bretton Woods system gave 
intermediate liquidity to trade through fixed exchange rates, a mid-course 
between the rigidity of the gold standard and the uncertainty of floating 
exchange rates. US advantage in the export of some commodities built up 
large US current account surpluses, which were invested in Europe, 
adding to the Marshall Plan investment. Finally, US political domination 
kept trade union bargaining power and wage demands low, and the profit 
margin up. 
(2) The regime of domestic accumulation is the Keynesian element in the 
model, defining a set of mechanisms for managing growth of output and 
employment. This growth of output and employment depends on the 
investment demand, on the one hand, and the supply of saving, on the 
other hand. In the golden age, the investment demand was kept high 
through a high profit share, low wage demands, high productivity, and 
high government expenditure. High savings to match this high investment 
demand were ensured through the expectation of high profit rates. 
(3) The regime of production is the explicitly Marxist element in the 
Regulationist school, defining capital labour relations. In the golden age, 
subordination of labour went from Fordist centralisation of production to 
Taylorist machine-based and rule-directed systems. The knowledge, 
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authority, and responsibility of labour was replaced by the machine and 
the rule book. 
(4) The rules of coordination is the regime by which the actions of agents, 
firms, and states are aligned. The regulationist school uses this element in 
tandem with the regimes of accumulation and production. Neoclassical 
theory uses a price regime to determine profits which determine capital 
allocation and accumulation, and wages to guide labour allocation and 
effort. However, the Marxists and the regulationists contend that 
capitalists never really rely on the price mechanism. They need to convert 
labour into labour power, keep the wage share low and the profit share 
high. This boils down to price mechanisms to control labour and its 
product. For this, the golden age used a variety of wage mechanisms, like 
efficiency wages and keeping the cost of job loss high. 
The basic causal mechanism for the end of the golden age, according to this 
regulationist school, was full employment and high wage-led profit squeeze. This 
slowed down both the investment demand and savings, lowering capital 
accumulation, employment, and output. Bowles and Boyer (1990) attribute ultimate 
causality to a high employment-led decline in productivity relative to wage demands 
in the US and Europe. The lagging labour productivity converted the US trade 
surpluses and undervalued Dollar into trade deficits and an overvalued Dollar. As a 
result, the US pulled out from gold convertibility in 1969, and Bretton Woods was 
abandoned to floating exchange rates by 1973. 
2.2.  Problems with the Paradigm 
For our purposes these four regimes provide a broad-based framework to 
analyse a micro or macro economy. However, this hybrid school shares a major 
problem with its neoclassical and Marxist predecessors in that the categories that it 
offers for analysis, the regimes, are still too abstract. 
The neoclassical categories of the agent and the market, the Marxist categories of 
capital, labour, the mode of production, and the state, and the regulationist regimes of the 
global economy, domestic accumulation, production, and rules of coordination, all 
synthesised together, give a nested set of categories. Beginning at the atomistic level, the 
agent operates within a class, controlled by the regime of production and rules of 
coordination. Both the agent and his product enter the labour and commodity markets 
simultaneously. The mode of production determines the technology and the product mixes 
and productivities. At the level of the regime of accumulation, the production and 
coordination regimes and the mode of production determine the macro conditions of profit-
wages and savings-investment. Finally, all these environments are nested and coordinated 
with the global economy. 
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All these nested categories would appear to give a wealth of detail about 
behaviour at each level. However, a critical determinant of behaviour which is still 
missing is the social constraints. This critical variable of constraints is provided by 
the literature on institutions. 
 
3.  THE INSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM 
 
3.1.  The Paradigm 
Institutional theory initially emerges from the neoclassical dilemma of the 
need to reduce externalities of the firm [Coase (1937)]. Demsetz (1967) argues that 
it is the change in the institution of property rights that allows externalities to be 
internalised within the new property rights. Therefore, property rights change to 
increase economic efficiency. North and Thomas (1973) give the example that 
property rights will tend to move towards private property. The argument is that 
jointly owned property has high transaction costs in sharing inputs and output, which 
reduce the owner’s incentive for investing in technical change on the land. An 
institutional change towards private property reduces the transaction costs entailed 
by joint property, and increases the owner’s incentive to invest in technical change. 
Institutional change, therefore, moves towards efficiency. 
The argument that emerges for our purposes is that property rights illustrate 
that institutions are man-made constraints imposed on economic functioning, or, 
more broadly, on social interaction. Therefore, institutions are a critical variable that 
constrains growth. North (1992) uses a formal definition that institutions define and 
limit the choice set of individuals. 
The central question then for North (1992), and for us, is the need to explain 
the divergent growth paths of economies, when international trade theory argues for 
convergence. North’s formulation of the problem is that growth theorists like 
Kuznets, Dennison, and Abramovitz trace growth causally to the sources of 
productivity growth. These sources of productivity growth are modelled in a zero 
transaction cost world, which is to depend on the stock of knowledge applied to 
physical and human capital. This model of course gives an upper bound to growth, 
or potential growth. The dilemma for North is: Why is this potential for growth not 
fulfilled in some cases? North’s hunch is that the model makes a critical assumption 
of a common incentive structure. The structure of incentives and constraints built 
into institutions should explain divergent growth paths for economies. 
The question now becomes twofold. If there are efficient and inefficient 
institutions, first, why do inefficient institutions arise, and second, why does 
competition not drive out inefficient institutions over time [North and Thomas 
(1973)]? 
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North’s answer to the first question, of the origin of inefficient institutions, is 
that rulers devise property rights in their own interests, which entail transaction 
costs, which demarcate inefficient institutions [North (1981)]. This is a definitional 
identity. 
North’s answer to the second question is more complex, less tautological (1992). 
He makes a crucial distinction between institutions and organisations. Organisations are 
defined as groups of individuals bound by common objectives, including political bodies 
like parties and parliament, economic bodies like firms and trade unions, educational 
bodies like schools and universities, and social bodies like trade associations. Institutions 
are defined as the rules that give a structure of incentives and constraints. Institutions and 
organisations then interact, with the institutional structure determining organisations, 
which in turn influence institutional change. 
North (1992) argues that in a zero-transaction costs world, political and 
economic markets are efficient because agents either have true models or, even if 
initially incorrect models, the information feedback corrects them. However, North 
rejects the rational agent model, choosing the alternative set of premises: 
 (i) agents often act on incomplete information; and 
 (ii) agents process this information often on imperfect subjective models. 
Therefore, North’s answer is that transaction costs in political and economic 
markets lead to inefficient property rights, and agents’ imperfect subjective models 
lead to the persistence of such inefficient property rights. 
North (1992) further divides the institutional matrix of an economy into two 
parts, informal constraints and transaction costs. Informal constraints are the cultural 
values transmitted. Transaction costs, such as those in the political market, when 
high, give political actors autonomy from their constituents, and so lower the 
incentives for radical political and economic change. 
3.2. The Linkage 
Institutional theory is nascent and weak, but it makes one argument which is 
important for us, that an economy’s potential growth is constrained by its institutional 
matrix of incentives and constraints. By analogy, going from the macro to the meso and 
micro levels, the nested abstract categories given to us by the neoclassical, Marxist, and 
regulationist schools all need to be constrained by the institutional-organisational 
interaction operating in them. Applying the constraints of institutions to these categories 
produces a very interesting result of fracturing the categories. As instances for the 
argument, we can take the categories of the global economy, and capital, labour, and the 
state in Pakistan. Constraining the operation of these categories through institutional 
specification gives them tendencies contrary to the expected, and/or splits the categories 
with divergent trends within the same category. 
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 (i) At the level of the global economy, neoclassical theory accepts de facto, 
while Marxist theory posits de jure, that capital-labour relations are 
conflictual. Both Europe and the US adopted a capital-labour relations 
regime which is Fordist and Taylorist, and so deskills labour. However, the 
Japanese production regime never became wholly Taylorist, preferring 
instead a familial concept of employment given by the indigenous culture 
[Marglin (1990)]. This concept of familial capital-labour relations then 
becomes the centre piece of the new Japanese production regime based on 
flexible specialisation, labour reskilling, workers’ innovations, ‘Kanban’ 
just in time reduced inventories, batches of one, and total quality control 
[Piore and Sabel (1984)]. Labour is reskilled, re-authorised, and 
responsibilised. This Japanese regime of capital-labour relations is now 
held to be a critical element in the continuation of Japanese export-led 
growth while the ICs golden age faded. As such, it has had important 
demonstration effects on the designing of cooperative capital-labour 
institutions in Scandinavia and Northern Italy. 
 (ii) In Pakistan, the category of industrial production capital does not appear to 
be homogenous. Institutional specification instead shows several divergent 
interests in production capital, fracturing the class. 
  (a) Industrial production capital appears riven into at least two dominant 
regional groups, the larger being Punjab-based capital, and the smaller 
being Frontier-based capital. Industrial production capital, with a 
theoretically posited homogeneity of interests, is fractured along 
regional and ethnic lines in Pakistan. The split becomes evident when 
the state allocates fiscal and infrastructural incentives to the two 
regions. 
  (b) A more momentous fracturing is evident in industrial production 
capital in Pakistan between the large-scale and the small-scale sectors. 
The small-scale sector, which employs 75 percent of the industrial 
population, is clearly starved for formal credit and capital assets to 
boost its productivity and income. It has a share of only 2 percent each 
in the formal credit and the total capital assets. The growth of 
employment, productivity, and income of the predominant population 
in industry is, thus, blocked by institutional fracturing of the category 
of production capital. 
 (iii) The category of industrial labour is also fractured into the large- and small-
scale sectors. 25 percent of industrial labour, employed by the large-scale 
sector having higher productivity, wages, and growth in these variables, can 
be organised by law, have union representation, and considerable welfare 
Mahmood and Durr-e-Nayab 680 
benefits, relative to the 75 percent who remain unorganised, unrepresented, 
and have no benefits. Social welfare proposals made for the informal small-
scale sector’s labour are strongly resisted by the union representation of the 
organised large-scale sector, and by the International Labour Organisation, 
under the guise of the need for welfare deepening before welfare widening 
[Mahmood (1994)]. Again the fracturing of class interests is seen to inhibit 
the growth of real incomes and the welfare of the predominant industrial 
population. 
 (iv) A final instance of the institutional fracturing of categories can be given 
here for the state in Pakistan. Political theories about the lack of governance 
by the state abound, but our concern here is to discern evidence of the 
fracturing of interests in the state. We can define, somewhat simplistically, 
the designated function of the state to be decision-making in order to 
increase welfare. We can also posit that some proportion of state employees 
use this objective function. Alternatively, we can posit another objective 
function of state employees to be decision-making in order to seek rents, 
direct or indirect, from the control of access to a resource. 
Now the state’s decision-makers comprise professionals and politicians. Our 
tentative argument is that the state’s decision-makers are split between the two 
objective functions of welfare-enhancing and rent-seeking. The fractured state 
causes problems of governance, inefficiency, and loss of welfare for the population. 
 
3.3.  Problems with the Institutional Paradigm 
The institutional school allows us to add specificity to the abstract categories 
developed so far. Adding this institutional specificity shows that these categories, 
instanced by global capital labour regimes, and the categories of industrial capital 
and labour, and the state in Pakistan are fractured. Moreover, this fracturing has 
major loss of welfare implications. The institutional school, however, does not help 
us to determine what causal factors contribute to this fracturing of categories. This 
causality is provided by two other schools, at a global level by post-modernism as 
applied to economic theory, and for LICs by post-development theory. 
 
4.  POST-MODERNISM 
 
4.1. The Paradigm 
Post-modernism holds that the traditional categories of analysis offered by 
modernist schools have been fractured. To examine the causal factors offered for this 
fracturing, we shall only use elements from the vast discourse which can be applied 
to economic theory, as done for instance by Brown (1991). 
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Post-modernism argues at a global level that the technological revolution after 
World War II has led to a global economic restructuring which fragments the 
categories of capitalism offered by the grand narratives of the market and class 
[Brown (1991)]. The causal arguments for this fragmentation of categories work on 
two levels: 
 (i) economic restructuring; and 
 (ii) consciousness of phenomena, with implications for theories of knowledge. 
(i)  Economic Restructuring 
The primacy of technical change is advocated by the instrumentalist value 
theory of Ayres [Harvey (1989)]. This position argues that the profit squeeze of the 
1960s, combined with technical change in electronics, has led to a speeding-up of 
turnover time in production and consumption to increase profits. This, in turn, 
implies volatility in demand patterns, and accordingly restructuring of production 
away from the mass consumption and production systems to post-Fordist Flexible 
Specialisation systems, as seen above in the discussion on the Japanese production 
regime. 
 
(ii)  Consciousness of Phenomena with Implications 
 for Theories of  Knowledge 
 (a) Post-modernism asserts a major philosophical postulate that there is no 
reality, physical or social, independent of the analytical tools used to 
perceive it [Nell (1980)]. A social category will capture as much detail as it 
is designed for. If a category is defined abstractly, it will not capture 
specificities like institutional fracturing. If institutional detail is specified in 
defining the category, then institutional fracturing can be found if it occurs. 
 (b) Technical change and accelerated turnover time have another major 
implication for consciousness of phenomena. Accelerated turnover time 
implies that there is a greater probability that we can experience the world 
differently from others. This fragments our experience of capitalism, 
implying multiple visions of reality rather than a single grand vision. 
Fragmentation of experience also dovetails with a multi-causal theory of 
phenomena, rather than a mono-causal one. The implication of these 
arguments is again a fragmentation of the categories of capitalism. 
 
4.2.  The Problems with Global Post-modernism 
The version of post-modernism seen here offers an explanation for the 
fragmentation of the categories of capitalism at a very abstract and global level. The 
primacy of technical change in the explanation also makes it more relevant in 
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analysing ICs rather than LICs. So it explains the fragmentation noted in global 
production regimes, between the Fordist-Taylorist production systems in the US and 
the familial, flexible-specialisation, labour-reskilling production systems in Japan. 
However, it does not explain the institutional fracturing of the categories of 
industrial capital, labour, and the state, as seen in Pakistan, which is not subject to 
such major technical change. This explanation for the fracturing of our analytical 
categories in the LICs can be attempted using the very nascent paradigm of post-
development theory. 
 
5.  POST-DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
5.1.  The Paradigm 
While post-modernism attacks the grand narratives of the project of 
modernisation, post-development theory with some lineage to post-modernism 
focuses its criticism on the more recent project of development in the LICs. 
The post-development school actually offers two linkages to our synthetic, 
broader paradigm of nested categories. One, it can be used to explain the fracturing 
of our categories of capital, labour, and the state in Pakistan and, where applicable, 
in the other LICs. Two, it adds a very important category of analysis to our synthetic 
paradigm: the growth of the macro and micro economy’s indigenous knowledge 
base, and its application to the three domestic regimes of accumulation, production, 
and the rules of coordination. 
The post-development school can be used to argue that the categories of 
capital, labour, the state, and the entire institutional matrix of an LIC will tend to be 
fractured by its colonial experience and, more importantly, by its subsequent 
development experience [Marglin (1991); Banuri (1991)]. The development 
experience will tend to fracture the institutional matrix of the LIC into traditional 
and modern sectors, with the traditional sector involuting, and the modern sector 
stripped of its indigenous cultural institutions and knowledge systems. 
The logic of the argument is the following. 
Development theory, a paradigm for economic change evolving since World 
War II, argues that growth without development and modernisation is an insufficient 
condition for either growth or welfare [Marglin (1991)]. The reason is that unless 
growth is complemented by change in the economic, political, social, and cultural 
infrastructure—that is, institutional change, growth and increase in welfare will be 
transitory. The end state of development, variously defined as growth with 
redistribution by Little, basic needs by Streeten, and levels of individual capabilities 
by Sen, requires a process of modernisation. This process of modernisation implies 
economic change through structural transformation of industry and agriculture, 
political change through rationalisation of authority and a rational bureaucracy, 
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social change through weakening of ascriptive ties, and cultural change through 
secularisation and science. The post-development school argues that the package of 
growth must be decoupled from the package of development, modernisation, and 
entailed institutional change [Marglin (1991); Banuri (1991)]. There are several 
arguments why the package of development, modernisation, and entailed 
institutional change is neither necessary nor a good for an LIC. 
 (i) The first step in the argument is that the project of development, 
modernisation, and entailed institutional change is Eurocentric, based on a 
solipsism, and therefore has a linear view of social progress. The metaphor 
of development implies that the ICs are the end state, which gives a linear 
path that LICs must follow, and their progress be judged by the distance 
covered. 
 (ii) The second step in the argument is that culture is a set of knowledge 
systems, characterised by their own epistemology, and rules for 
transmission, innovation, and power relations. 
 (iii) The third step in the argument is that the political dominance of the ICs in 
the West gives them intellectual dominance over the LICs’ cultural 
knowledge systems [Banuri (1991)]. This has two major implications. One, 
the package of development, modernisation, and entailed institutional change 
imposed on the LICs is the Eurocentric one, rather than their own indigenous 
culture-based knowledge systems. Two, when we apply this to our synthetic 
paradigm of nested categories, we know that institutions must nest in the 
domestic regimes of accumulation, production, and rules of coordination to 
determine growth paths. The Japanese example of a familial institution of 
employment used in the regime of production, and its success, illustrates the 
importance of indigenous institutions in determining growth. 
 (iv) The fourth step in the argument is that the project of development and 
modernisation entails institutional change in the LICs, which fractures the 
institutional matrix of the economy. Using North’s differentiation of the 
institutional matrix into organisations and the interacting institutional 
framework, development and modernisation fractures these organisations 
and the institutional framework into modern and traditional sectors. The 
modern sector is based on borrowed Eurocentric knowledge systems, while 
the traditional sector is based on indigenous knowledge systems. More 
importantly, the modern institutional choice set expands with development, 
while the traditional choice set shrinks [Marglin (1991)]. The traditional 
choice set shrinks because it is starved for resources and the cultural space 
that it needs to evolve, while the modern choice set is often imposed 
coercively on a reluctant population [Marglin (1991)]. 
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5.2.  Linkages 
So post-development theory provides us with a good explanation of why the 
categories of capital and labour were seen to fracture in the case of Pakistan. Capital 
in the modern large-scale sector in Pakistan has the access to formal market-
subsidised credit, imported technology, and Western production systems, which 
allow it to expand its productivity and profits but keeping its employment levels 
almost constant. Whereas capital in the traditional small-scale sector has no access to 
formal market-subsidised credit; in consequence, it resorts to high-interest informal 
market credit, uses in large part indigenous atrophying technology, is based on 
family labour, and has low productivity and profits. Development and neoclassical 
theory is misplaced if it recommends that the traditional small-scale sector can only 
grow by subcontracting links to the large-scale sector. We would argue that this 
strategy would simply lead to the large-scale sector exploiting the cheap family 
labour of the small-scale sector. Alternatively, the small-scale traditional sector 
should be given access to credit and appropriate institutional support, which will 
allow it to innovate its indigenous technology and production systems, which have 
been stagnating for lack of resources and cultural space and support. 
This argument by symmetry applies to the fractured category of labour in 
Pakistan as well. Labour in the predominant small-scale sector will gain more 
through the autonomous growth of the sector rather than through its growth as an 
auxiliary sector for the large-scale sector. The question of the trade unions 
constraining the expansion of organising legislation and the social welfare benefits 
to the small-scale informal sector labour is a more complex one, and needs to be 
examined along with the posited fracturing of the state in Pakistan. 
We have posited that the state fractures on the basis of two objective 
functions, i.e., decision-making to increase welfare and decision-making for rent-
seeking. Perhaps the role of trade unions reluctant to expand rights and welfare to 
the informal sector also puts them into the same set as the state. Trade unions can 
either work to enhance welfare, or they can seek rents. Extension of rights and 
benefits to the majority of labour in the small-scale sector would be welfare-
enhancing; constraining this extension implies rent-seeking. 
The question then remains as to why this expanded definition of the state is 
fractured by these two objective functions. Post-development theory again provides 
an analogy to this fracturing. The objective function of decision-making to increase 
welfare perhaps belongs to a more traditional indigenous cultural concept of the 
state’s primary function. The objective function of decision-making for rent-seeking 
is closer to a modern private firm’s objective function. The demonstration effect of 
the modern private sector firms’ objective function is driving up the incidence of 
rent-seeking in the state. The traditional objective function of welfare is shrinking in 
the state. 
Linking Four Emerging Paradigms in Economic Theory 685 
Finally, post-development theory adds a critical category to our synthetic 
paradigm of nested categories, that of the use of indigenous knowledge systems in 
the three domestic regimes of accumulation, production, and the rules of 
coordination. Banuri (1991a) argues that non-Western cultural maps are more 
balanced between the impersonal and the personal, and so would promote more 
cohesion. This use of the traditional choice set would, therefore, offer more 
cooperative solutions in production systems. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this paper has not been a formal critical interpretation of the 
literature. The objective has been to look for symmetries and complementarities 
between four emerging paradigms in economic theory. The methodology has been to 
identify analytical categories which are useful in characterising a micro or macro 
economy to determine its growth. This gives a synthetic paradigm of nested 
categories. 
The neoclassical paradigm gives the polar categories of the agent and the 
market. The Marxist paradigm gives the intermediate categories of class relations 
between capital and labour, the mode of production, and the state. The regulationist 
school offers a grand synthesis of regimes that characterise an economy, the global 
economy regime, the regime of accumulation, the regime of production, and the 
regime of the rules of coordination. 
These nested abstract categories are given local specificity and constraints by 
the institutional school. Institutional specification allows us to capture a very 
interesting fracturing of categories for capital, labour, and the state in the case of 
Pakistan. 
This fracturing of categories is explained by two schools: at the global 
abstract level, by the post-modernist school; and for the LICs, by the post-
development school. The post-modern school attributes fracturing of the categories 
of capitalism to a complex combination of global restructuring, accelerated turnover 
time reducing shared experience and so fragmenting reality, and the assertion of 
more subjective theories of consciousness. 
The post-development school argues that the project of development is 
Eurocentric politically, and therefore intellectually dominant and coercive. It splits 
the institutional matrix of the LIC into expanding modern choice sets and shrinking 
traditional choice sets. The post-development school argues for the need of cultural 
space to develop indigenous knowledge systems. It adds an important category to 
our synthetic paradigm of nested categories, that of the application of indigenous 
knowledge systems to the three domestic regimes of accumulation, production, and 
rules of coordination. 
Mahmood and Durr-e-Nayab 686 
This extremely limited exercise leaves us a large agenda for research. One 
point of departure for research is Nandy’s (1983) definition of progress as the 
expansion of awareness of exploitation. This perspective transforms the role of 
intervention and knowledge systems, which become the new research priorities. 
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